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Introduction
In 2000, in Paris, the second meeting1 of the “Association des Historiens de la Tradition
Economique Autrichienne” (Association of the Historians of the Austrian Economic Tra-
dition) (AHTEA) was devoted to the Austrian contributions to Applied Economics. The
idea was to show that, in Walrasian parlance, Austrian Economics (AE) was not only a
“pure” theory but also an “applied” one. In other words, there was room for an Applied
Austrain Economics (AAE). After two levels of editorial selection (at the AHTEA level
and at the RAE one) this volume presents some of the contributions that were presented at
this meeting.
The fact that AE is able to address most of the theoretical and public policy questions is
now recognized even by those who challenge its approach. However, the capacity of AE
to produce applied economic results remains a great challenge. Indeed the main arguments
advanced against the existence of an AAE can be presented as follows.
– First, AE is said to be reluctant to empirically test the conclusions of its theories. This
argument is certainly true for some Austrians. Indeed the Misesians, because they assume
some a priori categories, consider that thanks to the logical properties of the if. . . then
proposition, it is necessary for a proposition, logically deduced from a true assumption,
to be true. It is then not necessary to test the praxeological propositions just because the
praxeological assumptions are true.2 The only thing we then have to ensure is the logical
coherence of the chain of our deductive reasoning. Hayekians are not accepting this a
priori conception. Even if it is possible to discuss the fact that Hayek is or not Popperian,
it is difficult to accept the idea that he is an apriorist. He is fundamentally a realist in the
sense that he thinks that we need to test our theoretical conclusions. Menger, because
he is an “essentialist”, and Mises, because of his “apriorism”, do not think that it is
necessary.3
The idea that empirical tests are needed is then, according to Misesians, a false problem
because the hypothesis logically deduced from praxeological assumptions empirically
apply. According to Hayek, the empirical element is fundamental to progress in economic
science, because economics is not a “pure logic of choice”.4
– Second, AE is said to be reluctant to use mathematics, which makes its arguments less
conclusive and its results untestable. On this point there is confusion. It is often argued that
mathematics is less ambigous than natural languages. The syntactic clarity that mathemat-
ics ensures enables it to produce (quasi) universal and perfectly coherent reasoning. There
is, however, a trade-off between the degree of ‘realism’ of the assumptions and the rich-
ness of the language used to translate and manage them. In other words, “the mathematical
problems [. . .] are formulated completely in unambiguous words.” (Georgescu-Roegen
1971: 91, italics in the original). As an example, let’s assume that time is not “Newtonian”
but “Real” (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985). This idea is deduced from the assumption that
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it is important to take into account the fact that individuals are sensitive (in terms of the
way they behave) to their own representation of time. In this way as far as real time is
space- and-time–dependent (i.e. real time is different for different individuals and is vary-
ing in the course of time itself for the same individual), it is impossible to use any formal
language to take this phenomenon into account.5 The decision to use or not to use a for-
mal language is then dependent on the richness of the assumptions that are introduced.6
The utility of mathematics (or more generally formal tools) is then linked to the trade-off
defined above.7
More fundamentally, the use of mathematics is dependent on the very definition of
economics one holds. As an example, Menger, when he exchanges the five famous letters
with Walras, tells Walras that for him mathematics is only a tool of exposition but not
at all a tool for research. Indeed his essentialist conception of the “exact orientation of
research in economics” is incompatible with the use of mathematics.8 In a different way,
Mises is also spetical as to the use of mathematics due to his conception of economics.
In this case it is not at all a question of trade off but a much more fundamental problem
of the conception of our discipline.
To sum up, the question (is AE compatible with the use of mathematics or any other
formal language?) has no simple answer. On our first point (“realism” or “complexity”
of the assumptions) it is a question of how we define the problem we deal with and what
kind of assumptions we advance. On the second level it is a yes or no answer, in relation
to the conception we have of our discipline.
– Third, some maintain that the propositions the AE obtains are too “ideology-ladden” and
are thus less justified than value-free propositions. This argument is not convincing. Some
Austrians insist on the idea of Wertfrei. This Rothbardian9 idea assumes that AE needs to
be free from values. In this way the distinction between positive and normative aspects of
economics becomes irrelevant. The Wertfrei assumption, however, is not accepted by the
Austrians. As an example, it can be defended that there is a discrepancy (i.e. a disconti-
nuity) between the positive contributions of Hayek and his normative ones, even if some
Austrians believe that the optimality of the liberalism can be deduced from very positive
Hayekian assumptions. Whatever conception we have, this is not an argument against the
possibility of the existence of an AAE. Either the Wertfrei asumption is true and the argu-
ment falls or it is not and it is possible to discuss the applicability of the results of AE on the
basis of the distinction between positive and normative hypothesis as “standard”
economics does.
On the basis of the very short discussion above, the idea that there is no possibility for
an AAE to exist can be challenged. The contributions of this volume provide concrete
answers to this end. For instance, one contribution uses statistical data (Koppl and Mramor)
in order to test theoretical Austrian developments. The Amendola, Gaffard and Musso
contribution simulates the behavior of a neo-Austrian model. The Dulbecco paper shows
that an Austrian conception of institutions is able to explain some stylized facts. Mougeot’s
historical reconstruction applies Hayek’s conception of social evolution to the role of a
“corporation” in the transition to an open society.
Thomas J. McQuade and William N. Butos apply the Austrian conception of order and
evolution to the scientific world. They start with the idea that “the mechanisms involved in the
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production and transmission of scientific knowledge are, as we have stressed, different from
those that explain the functionning of the cattalaxy”. Their paper emphasizes the importance
of reputation as a motivation for scientists. The citations are considered as indicators of
reputation even if it is not sufficient to reduce the problem to a “simple compilation of data
published in citation indices”. The paper then analyzes issues related to the author’s signal
(i.e.“The positive effect of prior reputation at the margin”), competition between authors,
citation measurement and issues relating to the effects knowledge generation regarding the
stability and evolution of order.
Abel Franc¸ois proposes an application of the Austrian analysis of the entrepreneur to
the political process. He defines the political counterparts of the main concept of Austrian
entrepreneur. He shows, for example, that even if the political and economics markets are
different, it is possible to translate what is motivating the economic entrepreneur, monetary
profit, into some political incentives, the electoral outcome. As a consequence, it is possible
to say that political entrepreneurs are innovators. Abel Franc¸ois shows that such a parallel
is useful as far as institutional mutations are concerned.
Christelle Mougeot starts with the fact that Hayek stresses that the Open Society emerges
from the Archaı¨c one. An evolutionary process based on the fact that abstract rules take
the place of concrete ones explains this phenomenon. Christelle Mougeot tries to apply this
Hayekian way of thinking to an historical case, the role of the medieval Craft Guilds.
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Philippe Musso propose a neo-Austrian paper.
Its aim is to deal with the relations between competition and innovation. In a neo-Hicksian
fashion it focusses on the idea that capacities need to be built up before they can be used.
It stresses the idea that competition is a process. The idea is then to combine these two
sides of the same coin and to show with a model that there is a kind of trade-off between
competition and innovation. The financial constraints are shown to be able to stabilize the
whole process and to avoid over-investment. They use numerical simulations in order to
analyze the behavior of their model.
The Augier and Augier paper is also neo-Hicksian and can be considered as a borderline
case in the Austrian “orthodox” tradition. Using the Austrian concept of production period,
it compares different models both in line with and outside the Austrian tradition that use
this concept. The basis of this comparaison is the exogenous versus endogenous definition
of the production period. One of the main interests of this paper is that in using formal
models it finds results that are very close to non formalized Austrain ones.
The Philippe Dulbecco paper is theoretical as well as empirical. Indeed it first develops
a Lachmannian conception of the dynamics of institutions as rooted in an economics of
time and ignorance. The idea is that there is a necessary coherence between institutions
and market process. The problem is then to analyse institutional changes in terms of their
compatibilities with market process. On an empirical level Dulbecco applies this theoretical
framework both to the financial crises of emerging countries and to the decentralisation
process taking place in China.
Roger Koppl and Dusan Mramor’s paper is very innovative. It uses the Theory of Big
Players, which is based on the idea that a player is discretionary orienting the course of
economic events. This theory seeks to explain some phenomenon such as the “persitent
dependence” (positive as well as negative). It provides an interesting way of explaining
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“irrational” bubbles, “bandwagon effects” or “herding”. Koppl and Mramor apply this
theory to the evolution of the Slovenia stock market and the role of the central bank
(as a Big Player) in this evolution. The statistical analysis presented in the paper corrobotates
their approach.
Michel Que´re´ and Jacques-Laurent Ravix’ paper also deals with an empiral application of
the Austrian conception of institutions. It tries to combine Menger and Hayek’s conceptions
of institutions in order to analyze the relations between science and industry. They propose
a typology of those relations which enables them to explain two of the main empirical
charactristics of innovative institutions: the production of knowledge and the process of
interactive learning.
Acknowledgment
I thank Pete Boetkke for helpful remarks and formal corrections of a first draft of this
introduction. Usual caveats apply.
Notes
1. In 1999, in Paris too, the first AHTEA meeting dealt with “Hayek as a Political Economist: Economic Analysis
and values”. Some of the contributions are published in Birner, Garrouste and Aimar (2002).
2. Mises (1978).
3. For a more developed analysis of the comparison between Menger, Mises and Hayek on methodology, see
Dufourt and Garrouste (1993).
4. Hayek (1937).
5. The idea that it is not possible to use mathematics to deal with the assumption of subjectivism is well developed
in Lachmann (1986). It is interesting to see that some recent works in economics are taking into account the
heterogeneity of individuals (for example, Kirman 1999).
6. Boettke (2002) also shows the difficulty to use traditional tools to deal with the distinction between information
and knowledge.
7. One needs not to forget that mathematics as well as formalized tools are evolving, and then are not fixed.
8. See for example, Garrouste (1994).
9. I say Rothbardian because he seems to be the one who defends the idea with the most strength.
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